New Jersey Criminal Lawyers Blog

A conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C: 29-2b (Resisting Arrest; Eluding Officer) requires that the person fleeing must "knowingly flee or attempt to elude any police or law enforcement officer after having received any signal from such officer to bring the vehicle or vessel to a full stop."

A recent unpublished New Jersey Appellate Division case discussed this issue. (State v. Padilla-Bustamante). The relevant facts involve the defendant who "fled" the scene of a crime because he feared for his own safety. While giving a ride home to some people he knew from a tavern, the defendant stopped for gas. While at the gas station, the defendant's passengers left his automobile and began to engage in a fight. He left the scene and returned. The passengers involved in the fight returned to the car and the defendant once again fled the scene. He was signaled by a police officer to pull over, but did not. The vehicle came to a stop only when it was involved in a collision. At that point, the defendant and a passenger exited the vehicle and ran into a wooded area. A police officer caught up with them and the defendant explained that he was the driver of the vehicle and fled the scene because he was afraid for his safety.

At trial, a jury convicted the defendant of "eluding". The defendant argues that the jury instruction on the doctrine of flight was clear error by the judge. The Appellate Division agreed, overturning the conviction for eluding and remanded the trial. The trial judge explained the doctrine of "flight" as occurring after "an offense" or "a crime" but did not explicitly say which crime he was referring to (there were multiple charges levied against the defendant). The Appellate Division found that this was clear error because the instructions to the jury could have implied a presumption of guilt, which could have unfairly prejudiced the jury's perception of the character of the defendant. The "flight" charge was not at all connected to the "eluding" charge, but the jury instruction by the trial judge seemed to confuse the two. The "flight" charge could only be linked to the other charges levied against the defendant. The eluding charge required that the defendant knew he was eluding an officer. At trial, the defendant claimed that he did not look in his rear view mirror and he did not stop because he was in fear for his safety. A reasonable jury could hear that evidence and choose not to convict him of eluding.