In a story that appeared in the online edition of the Star Ledger on October 6, reporter Steve Strunsky writes that the lawyer for Dharun Ravi issued a statement in which he expressed some confidence that his client would not face bias or hate crime charges in connection with the tragic case that caused Rutgers student Tyler Clementi to take his own life.
Mr. Ravi's lawyer, Steven D. Altman, takes his confidence from what he sees as the Middlesex County Prosecutor's Office deliberate handling of the case against Mr. Ravi. As Steve Strunsky reports, Mr. Altman feels a thorough collecting of the facts surrounding the case will benefit his client, and that, "nothing will be learned to justify, warrant or support the filing of any bias criminal complaint."
Meanwhile, Middlesex County Prosecutor Bruce Kaplan maintains that no final decision has been made with respect to any additional charges being filed against Mr. Ravi. Mr. Kaplan says that decision awaits an evaluation of all the evidence currently being gathered.
For now, Mr. Ravi and Molly Wei, also charged in connection with the case, have been charged with third and fourth degree invasion of privacy crimes.
It is interesting to note that New Jersey's hate crime statute, as it then existed, was reviewed by the United States Supreme Court in the 2001 case of New Jersey v. Apprendi. At the time of the Apprendi case, an interesting aspect of New Jersey's hate crime statute was codified as N.J.S.A. 2C: 44-3(e), which, as a result of the Apprendi decision, was repealed by the New Jersey state legislature .
For the majority of the Supreme Court Justices in Apprendi, the problem with New Jersey's hate crime statute was that it allowed a judge to impose an enhanced prison sentence if the judge was satisfied, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the elements of the hate crime statute has been satisfied. Specifically, the justices in the majority had two problems with this scheme. First, in cases where a jury decided guilt on the underlying crime, the justices thought it improper for the judge presiding over the case to make a separate finding of guilt with respect to the elements of the hate crime statute. Second, the standard of proof under which the judge was to make that determination- a preponderance of the evidence- was a far lower evidentiary standard than what is used in criminal trials: beyond a reasonable doubt.
Under the New Jersey hate crime statute as it was written at the time of Apprendi, a judge could condemn a defendant to prison time over and above that prescribed for the underlying crime, and do so on the basis of a civil law standard of proof. The holding in Apprendi struck down the New Jersey hate crime statute as a violation of constitutional protections owed defendants facing a loss of their freedom. Here is Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in Apprendi:
"In sum, our reexamination of our cases in this area, and of the history upon which they rely, confirms the opinion that we expressed in Jones. Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. With that exception, we endorse the statement of the rule set forth in the concurring opinions in that case: "[I]t is unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed. It is equally clear that such facts must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 526 U. S., at 252-253 (opinion of Stevens, J.); see also id., at 253 (opinion of Scalia, J.).[16]
The New Jersey statutory scheme that Apprendi asks us to invalidate allows a jury to convict a defendant of a second-degree offense based on its finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he unlawfully possessed a prohibited weapon; after a subsequent and separate proceeding, it then allows a judge to impose punishment identical to that New Jersey provides for crimes of the first degree, N. J. Stat. Ann. ยง 2C:43-6(a)(1) (West 1999), based upon the judge's finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant's "purpose" for unlawfully possessing the weapon was "to intimidate" his victim on the basis of a particular characteristic the victim possessed. In light of the constitutional rule explained above, and all of the cases supporting it, this practice cannot stand."
What all this means for Mr. Ravi and Ms. Wei is that, should they be charged with a bias crime, the jury will have to determine their motivations for the crimes charged- if crimes they are determined to be- and they must determine those motivations beyond a reasonable doubt.
